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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 11/07/2011 Accident number: 740 
Accident time: 10:37 Accident Date: 13/12/2010 
Where it occurred: AF/2401/21529, MF-
613, Khushab area, 
Kandahar province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: None 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed] 
CBDT 
 
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 11/07/2011 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
use of pick (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
disciplinary action against victim (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 





The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] CBDT-01 DMINING ACCIDENT  
[CBDT – Community Based Demining Team] 
INTRODUCTION:  
The demining accident investigation team was convened by AMAC South to investigate and 
find out the causes of demining accident involving Victim No.1] and Mr.[Victim No.2] the de-
miner and Section Leader of [Demining group] CBDT-01. The accident occurred on 13 Dec 
2010 at 10:37 in task # AF/2401/21529/MF-613 located in Khushab area of Kandahar 
province. 
SUMMARY: 
The above mentioned task is located in the southwest of Kandahar Airfield (KAF). This area 
was heavily mined by Russian forces. The AP mines (POMZ and PMN) are laid in four rows 
as belts surrounding the KAF in order to secure their positions from the attacks of 
Mujahideen.  
On the 13th Dec 2010 at 10:37, the deminer [Victim No.1] was operating in his clearance lane 
excavating a detected signal, his prodder touched on a subsurface tripwire of POMZ mine 
which caused it to explode. According to the investigation report the signal was not pinpointed 
correctly and the de-miner has used pick in contrary to set procedure, during the excavation, 
he pulled the subsurface tripwire connected with POMZ mine. The accident resulted in 
superficial injuries to deminer’s hands, left thigh and left side of abdomen. 
The report also adds that the Section Leader [Victim No.2] has also got some superficial 
injuries on the right side of his body. He was busy in other clearance lane around 10 metres 
away from the first victim deminer. He was removing bushes and other obstacle from a 
clearance lane.  
As the de-miner and section leader had not used PPE (vest & apron) correctly during the 
clearance operations, therefore they got multiple injuries. 
This is the second demining accident occurred in the same task, this accident clearly 
indicates lack of proper command and control within the team, showing that the command 
elements of the team were extremely careless about safety precaution. There was no any 
attention paid to safety distance and having vest & apron worn correctly.       
CONCLUSIONS: 
Clearance operations without having PPE (vest & apron) worn properly and using pick in 
contrary to approved procedures, showing the carelessness of de-miner. In addition the 
command element was also busy in clearance operations, this is against his job description 
and he also did not wear PPE properly, this indicates that there is a serious problem in 
command, control and supervision of the team.      
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
2 
However, disciplinary and corrective action was taken by [Demining group] immediately after 
the accident happened, the immediate section leader were punished with 15 day loss of pay 
and refresher training were recommend for the team. But this is not enough to eliminate such 
accidents in the future; [Demining group] should strongly consider the following points: 
A complete review of command, control and supervisory staff throughout the CBD 
[Community Based Demining] projects and take necessary actions. 
[Demining group] operations department is recommended to come up with a comprehensive 
plan of action for the improvement of command and control and supervision in their demining 
teams especially in CBD projects.  
[Demining group] should review, improve and strengthen current internal QA system to make 
sure that the shortcomings are identified and the appropriate actions are taken immediately.   
For the clearance operation in current task appropriate mechanical asset should be deployed.  
[Demining group] should ensure the use of PPE correctly and completely throughout their 
teams during demining operations in the field.  
[Demining group] operations department should plan a quality circle meeting to find out the 
root cause(s) of their demining accidents, develop appropriate plan and implement it in order 
to reduce such accidents.   
Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to 
be submitted to the MACCA within 7 days, effective from the issue of this report. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 929 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Body; minor Hands; minor Leg 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "superficial injuries to deminer's hands, 
left thigh and left side of abdomen". 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 930 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 




Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Body 




The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that the field control was inadequate on several counts (use of PPE, 
inadequate pinpointing, use of a pick-axe, ignoring safety distances). The secondary cause is 
listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators required the demining 
group’s management to review and revise its procedures to improve field command and 
control. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible than the 
internationals with overall responsibility.  
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